










THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF ORGANIZED CRIME.








Organized crime does not operate within a social vacuum; it interacts, however, with its social environment. Consequently, social relations are crucial for understanding the phenomenon of organized crime. The well-known studies of, for instance, Albini, Ianni and Reuss-Ianni  and Chambliss  have shown us how important social ties are in the world of organized crime.​[2]​ Furthermore, several authors – including Lupsha, Ianni and Reuss-Ianni, and Sparrow​[3]​  - have suggested that social network analysis might be a fruitful method to increase our understanding of criminal associations.​[4]​ 
Why social ties are so important, can be explained by the picture which Potter sketches of the environment in which offenders have to carry out their illegal activities: criminal associations operate in relatively hostile environments primarily as a function of their illegality; furthermore, they operate in relatively uncertain environments, both as a function of the illicit market and of the uncertain and changing nature of law enforcement policies and public attitudes.​[5]​  The world of organized crime might be characterized as a kind of ‘jungle’, a world in which the stakes are high; yet the rules and the mechanisms, which make transactions in the legal world so much easier, are absent: entering into contracts, paying via the official banking system and – in the case of disagreement - the availability of mediation or the judiciary. Let us consider, for instance, a drugs transport from country A to country B. During this transport goods of very high value are on their way within an unregulated, uncertain and potentially hostile environment. How does the supplier get a guarantee that the goods will be paid for? Who bears the risk if the illegal goods are confiscated? Who guarantees that the transporters will not embezzle the illegal goods and claim that these have been confiscated? And who provides protection against cheating and rip-offs by other offenders? These basic problems really differentiate illegal transactions from doing business in the legal world.  Hence, cooperation in the world of organized crime is not so easy and curbing distrust between offenders is a continually recurring problem.
Granovetter has contended that problems of distrust in economic transactions are mitigated by the fact that these transactions are ‘embedded’ within networks of personal relations.​[6]​ Several sociologists such as Coleman, Raub & Weesie, and Buskens have elaborated upon this idea of ‘embeddedness’.​[7]​ It would be interesting to apply these insights to the problems of distrust in the world of organized crime. Social relations not only provide new opportunities for offenders, making it possible to benefit from the resources of other offenders such as money, knowledge, and contacts. They also provide a (partial) solution for problems of cooperation in an unregulated, uncertain and hostile environment. First of all, social relations mitigate the problem of distrust because of the ‘temporal embeddedness’ of the behavior of actors who are related to one another: they have a common history and they act ‘in the shadow of a common future’. Hence, cooperation problems decrease, because they have information about one another, because they both have invested in the relationship, and because they know that they probably will meet again in the future. This ‘temporal embeddedness’ discourages opportunistic and selfish actions and has a stabilizing effect on their cooperation. Furthermore, the ‘network embeddedness’ also has a stabilizing effect, because the cooperating partners may use information from network contacts about one another and because they have to reckon with their own reputation within this wider social network.
	This article elaborates upon the ‘social embeddedness’ of organized crime, using data of the so-called ‘WODC-monitor on organized crime’ (section 2). The focus of section 3 is the role of social relations in international criminal associations. Section 4 deals with the assumed ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ of criminal groups. The subject of section 5 is the underexposed role of women in organized crime, whereas section 6 deals with the dynamics of criminal associations. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in section 7.

2.	The WODC-monitor on organized crime

The data used for this article are part of a continuing research project of the Research and Documentation Center (WODC) of the Ministry of Justice of the Netherlands: the so-called ‘WODC-monitor on organized crime’. In 1994 the Dutch Parliamentary Inquiry Committee into Criminal Investigation Methods concluded that an accurate description of organized crime in the Netherlands was lacking. Therefore, the Inquiry Committee appointed an external research group chaired by Professor Fijnaut to make an inquiry into the nature, seriousness and scale of organized crime in the Netherlands. After the publication of the report of the Fijnaut research group in 1996​[8]​, the Minister of Justice promised the Dutch Parliament to report periodically on the nature of organized crime in the Netherlands. Consequently, the Research and Documentation Center started the so-called ‘WODC-monitor on organized crime’, an ongoing systematic analysis of closed investigations of criminal groups. The aim of the research project was to increase the learning capacity of the criminal justice system and to construct a sound basis for preventive and repressive policy.
The first report of the WODC-monitor was based upon investigations which have been closed in the period 1996-1997 and which produced sufficient evidence to prosecute the offenders.​[9]​ Having made an inventory of all closed investigations, forty cases were selected for intensive analysis: sixteen cases concerning trafficking in ‘traditional’ drugs (hashish, heroin and cocaine), seven cases concerning the production of and trafficking of synthetic drugs, seven cases concerning trafficking in women and sexual exploitation, four cases concerning smuggling illegal immigrants, and six cases concerning fraud, money laundering and other illegal activities.​[10]​
The case studies started with interviewing the police officers and public prosecutors involved with regard to the following main questions:
1.	What kind of criminal groups engage in organized crime in the Netherlands?;
2.	What forms of illegal activities do these groups engage in and how do they operate?;
3.	How do these groups interact with the opportunities and risks of their environment?;
4.	What are the proceeds of the criminal activities and how do criminal groups spend these proceeds?
These questions in elaborated form were included in an extensive checklist, which was used during the interviews. After the interviews one of the six research workers of the team inspected all the relevant police data, resulting in a completed checklist.
The advantages of this research method are clear: quite reliable and valid information about closed investigations, which has been checked by the research team itself. However, a drawback of relying too heavily on closed investigations might be that one would make insufficient use of other sources of knowledge and that one would be blind to new developments. Therefore, we tried to track all these other sources of knowledge down in the Spring of 1998: information from other police investigations, public and confidential reports on organized crime, crime analysis reports, et cetera. Furthermore, we interviewed several key figures and experts on organized crime of various investigation departments. This resulted – next to the forty intensive case studies – in interview reports, a collection of 92 confidential reports, and more than one hundred abridged descriptions of closed and current criminal investigations.
	What are the main conclusions of the WODC-monitor on organized crime concerning the social embeddedness of organized crime? First of all, the forty case studies clearly reflect the importance of social ties. The wide variety of social relations, which can play a part in organized crime, is demonstrated by case 28:

The criminal association engaged among other things in the import of hashish from Morocco, dealing in XTC and amphetamines, and in the (attempted) import of ingredients for synthetic drugs from Eastern Europe. Suspect A, who used to live on a trailer park, was assisted by two of his sons; one of them played a prominent role in the illegal activities. The father and his two sons often collaborated with (ex-)trailer park residents D and Z, who had their own liaisons with trailer park residents in nearby regions. Suspect A had strong connections with Moroccan hashish suppliers. These connections had been established by a former companion, who was linked to these suppliers by a woman and her children who were protected by him. One of the daughters of this woman subsequently became the girl friend of A, reinforcing the strong bond with Moroccan suppliers and with prominent intermediaries in the Moroccan community in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the car trade provided the suspects with useful, (semi-)legal business contacts. Son B, for instance, became acquainted with someone who was involved in the cleansing business and had good connections with Eastern European suppliers of chemical products. These products could be used as ingredients for synthetic drugs. Finally, suspect A deliberately made investments into insolvent firms in order to take control of them. Consequently, he utilized these firms to facilitate his illegal activities (case 28).

This case makes clear that illegal activities are not only influenced by ‘strong ties’ such as family ties or bonds of friendship, but also by ‘weak ties’ which emerge from daily activities or are deliberately created and maintained. Strong ties as well as weak ties are affected to a large extent by the background of offenders and their daily activities: their social background; their ethnicity; where they come from; where they live; which legal and illegal activities they are involved with; and which important meeting places they attend (for instance: places of entertainment, clubs or prisons). Social relations do not emerge at random, but often follow the laws of social and geographical distance: the closer offenders live together, the more ground their daily activities have in common, and the less social distance exists between them, the more probable it is that ties emerge between these offenders.​[11]​  Since social relations do not emanate haphazardly, there is a certain logic to social networks which can also be recognized in criminal associations. Cases 17 and 19, for instance, mainly concern offenders who were born and raised in the same town, or in the same neighborhood. Consequently, it is no wonder that they are chiefly engaged in supplying local illegal markets. Also, in case 6 the principal criminal activities amount to supplying illegal markets in countries or places the offenders originated from, or have direct access to. This case though is about British offenders, who have fled to the Netherlands and who are now supplying the British market with cocaine, heroin, hashish, XTC and amphetamines from the Netherlands.

The claim that social relations are crucial for understanding the phenomenon of organized crime, is substantiated in the next sections by elaborating upon four different subjects: the  role of social relations in international criminal associations (section 3); the assumed ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ of criminal groups (section 4); the underexposed role of women in organized crime (section 5), and the dynamics of criminal associations (section 6).

3. Social relations and international criminal associations

Many forms of organized crime boil down to international smuggling activities. The social basis for these smuggling activities is among other things constituted by international migration flows. A clear example of this is the involvement in international drug trafficking of immigrant groups in the Netherlands.​[12]​ It is a historical coincidence that the very countries from which so many people emigrated to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s (Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, Aruba, Morocco and Turkey), turned into the leading producers or transit dealers of the major drugs for the European market in the 1980s and 1990s. The bulk of the heroin now comes from Turkey. Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba link Colombia and its cocaine to Europe, and Morocco has developed into the leading hashish producer. The social ties between the Netherlands and the old countries which have been created by migration, are a fertile breeding ground for international drug trafficking. 
The social logic of international drug trafficking is obviously demonstrated by the analyzed criminal associations. Over and over again family ties as well as bonds of friendship turn out to be the foundation for these international associations.  In case 16, for example: 

The core group of this criminal association included four old friends from the Antilles. One of them was born in Colombia and two of them emigrated to the Netherlands. The old friendship constituted the basis for trafficking cocaine from Colombia via the Antilles to the Netherlands. Two other acquaintances (a man from Suriname and another man from Ghana) were also involved in passing on the ‘airway bill numbers’ and intercepting parcel-post packages containing cocaine at the airport (case 16). 

Hence, social relations are able to bridge social and criminal networks in various countries. This is also clearly illustrated by case 7:

This case was again about trafficking cocaine from Southern America via the Caribbean to the Netherlands. The most vital link between the various countries was a man from the Netherlands Antilles, who was a ‘broker’ between Colombian suppliers and European buyers. His sister was married to a Colombian who occupied a fairly high position in a cocaine organization, which was mainly based upon family ties. The Antillean lived in the Netherlands for a while, resulting in connections with Antilleans in the Netherlands who bought the cocaine and distributed it. Another old acquaintance was a native Dutchman, who shipped – with some friends – the cocaine to the Netherlands (case 7).

Perhaps the examples above might suggest that ‘evil always comes from abroad’. Yet, of course, the same line of reasoning applies to, for instance, the trafficking of synthetic drugs from the Netherlands to other countries. This explains why trafficking not only occurs to neighboring countries such as Germany, Belgium and Great Britain, but also to Spain (with its Dutch enclaves at the Spanish coast). A similar example is the contact between Dutch seamen and Pakistani hashish dealers off the coast of Dubai in the early 1970s.​[13]​ The Dutch ships were stationed there for some hydraulic engineering projects, and the Pakistanis, with their trade of heroin as well as cannabis, were apparently being left alone by the Americans because revenues from their trade were going towards the battle against communism in Afghanistan. The result of these contacts was that several Dutch trailer camp residents funded large shipments of hashish to Europe and Northern America.

4. Ethnicity and organized crime

Traditionally organized crime and ethnicity are easily associated with one another. In the United States, for instance, the problem of organized crime has for a long time been defined purely in terms of the Italian Mafia​[14]​. According to the ‘alien conspiracy theory’ organized crime was imported to the United States in the wave of Italian migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The essence of organized crime was asserted to be embodied in a conspiracy of (Italian) outsiders. Even though federal law enforcement agencies have come to acknowledge that the underworld is not dominated solely by a single ethnic group, still ethnicity is often considered to be the key to determining group membership in organized crime.​[15]​ Also in the Netherlands law enforcement agents as well as social scientists often speak about Turkish groups, Moroccan groups, Dutch networks, et cetera. This indicates that implicitly it is assumed that criminal groups are ethnically homogeneous: Turkish offenders cooperate with Turkish offenders, Moroccan offenders cooperate with Moroccan offenders, and native Dutch offenders cooperate with other native Dutch offenders. 
The international literature on organized crime, however, presents several examples of crime groups comprised of or having substantial interactions with individuals of various ethnic backgrounds.​[16]​ This is one of the reasons why Albanese concluded: “Ethnicity is perhaps the most common of all categorizations of organized crime, although it might be the most misleading”.​[17]​

Our case studies also urge us to modify the picture of ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ of criminal groups. Of course, one cannot deny the fact that ethnicity plays an important part in the daily lives of offenders. Consequently, ethnicity certainly affects the composition of criminal associations. When offenders, however, cooperate with people of the same ethnicity, it is not ethnicity that matters in the first place, but the fact that these people are family or originate from the same village or the same region. The basis of criminal associations is not formed by ethnicity, but by the social relations that exist between various persons. This applies to both immigrant and native offenders.
On the other hand, it goes without saying that ethnic minorities do have more international ties than many native Dutchmen. These international ties create extra opportunities for illegal activities: easy access to the major drug producing countries or transit countries; to potential clients (for instance: smuggling of illegal immigrants); to markets (for instance: car theft); and to victims (for instance: trafficking in women). Ethnicity is also a salient factor in blackmail and extortion activities, since victims usually have the same ethnic background: Chinese extort Chinese,​[18]​ native Dutchmen extort native Dutchmen (case 19), and Turkish offenders extort other Turkish people (case 23). A Dutch report on extortion by Eastern Europeans makes clear why ethnic minorities are much more vulnerable: usually members of their families still live in the countries of origin.​[19]​ In this case the offender does not need to threaten with violence, since it is already sufficient to refer vaguely to children, a partner or an elderly mother living abroad.
	Hence, ethnicity certainly is a significant factor, as it affects social relations. It just so happens that family and friends often have the same ethnic background. Furthermore, being abroad one more easily establishes contact with people who speak the same language or who originate from the same country. A certain ethnic homogeneity of criminal associations, therefore, is obvious.
Ethnicity, however, is certainly not the key defining feature of the criminal associations that have been analyzed in our research project. Many of the associations are comprised of individuals from various ethnic backgrounds. This is especially the case for the associations involved in drug trafficking and trafficking in women.
It is possible to distinguish different levels of ethnic homogeneity. A frequently occurring pattern combines ethnic homogeneity of the inner group with relative heterogeneity when it comes to distribution. A typical example of this pattern is demonstrated by case 22:

Cocaine was shipped from South America to the Netherlands. From start to finish the smuggling process was controlled by Chileans. Virtually all the Chileans originated from the same city in Chili. The cocaine was distributed among others to some Moroccans, a Dutchman, a Frenchman and some Egyptians. All these people lived or stayed regularly in Amsterdam (case 22).

It seems quite natural that there will be more ethnic heterogeneity, the closer one gets to the end of the distribution chain. Strong ties become less important, since the transactions are dominated even more by utilizing one another’s distribution networks. Consequently, it stands to reason that there will be more contacts between people from different ethnic backgrounds.
Nevertheless ethnic heterogeneity does not always appear at the end of the distribution chain, but also in the core of criminal associations. Case 36, for instance, confirms at first glance the traditional view of Turkish drug trafficking.​[20]​ At second glance, however, it turns out that there are substantial interactions with individuals of various ethnic backgrounds:

A Turkish businessman was involved in legal activities as well as in trafficking heroin. He often called on family members to assist him with his legal activities (because ‘family members can be trusted’). Committing fraud, however, he was also supported by people from outside the Turkish community.
Trafficking heroin, the businessman called predominantly on old Turkish acquaintances, who subsequently involved family members to smuggle the heroin from Turkey to the Netherlands. All the same he also had relations with various people from outside the Turkish milieu: ‘underworld contacts’ as well as firmly fostered ‘upper-world contacts’. He even ventured into a very close criminal cooperation with a native Dutchman (case 36).

The example above shows clearly that a certain ethnic homogeneity can go hand in hand with a relatively easy ‘accessibility’ to individuals from different ethnic backgrounds. This even applies to ‘the core’ of criminal associations, as demonstrated by case 11:

The core of this criminal association comprised a native Dutch ‘hashish trader’ and two Turkish brothers. Having stayed in a Dutch prison for quite a long time, one of the brothers had established many contacts with native Dutch offenders. The other suspects originated from all corners of the world: Turkey, Colombia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Germany, Venezuela, Belgium and the Philippines. A lot of native Dutch offenders knew each other from the transport business.
The criminal association was involved in trafficking various kinds of drugs: importing hashish from Pakistan; smuggling heroin from Turkey and distributing it in, for instance, the Netherlands, Germany and Portugal; and importing cocaine from Colombia via ports in, among others, the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Great-Britain, France and Malta (case 11).

Perhaps the ethnic heterogeneity of case 11 is somewhat extreme. This case, however, definitely modifies the well-known picture of the ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ of criminal groups. Furthermore, it urges us to reconsider the traditional view that certain ethnic groups are specialized in particular kinds of drugs: native Dutch offenders trafficking in hashish and XTC to the exclusion of everything else, Colombians in cocaine, Moroccans in hashish, and Turks in heroin. Naturally, it goes without saying that there is a logical connection with both the established contacts and the availability of particular kinds of drugs in the countries of origin. Yet the example above clearly shows that sometimes the reality of Dutch organized crime is far more colorful than the picture of ‘ethnic specialization’ suggests. Our research especially falsifies the claim that Turkish offenders are simply and solely involved in trafficking in heroin. It appears that the trade in other drugs such as cocaine is becoming more important.
Furthermore, one might wonder whether or not case 11 reflects an important trend: is the ethnic heterogeneity of criminal associations in the Netherlands rising? Considering the preceding report of Fijnaut et al​[21]​ our results might indeed point in this direction. Furthermore, it is plausible that an increasing integration of immigrants in Dutch society will in the end also be echoed in the composition of criminal associations. Hence, the picture of ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ will gradually become less and less applicable to the reality of organized crime in the Netherlands.

5. The underexposed role of women in organized crime

The importance of social ties can also be demonstrated by looking into the role of women in organized crime. According to the traditional view crime - and especially organized crime - is predominantly a male phenomenon. Steffensmeier (1983), for instance, points out that where the stakes are high and the risk is great, organized crime is highly sexually segregated.​[22]​ The picture of women as ‘wife or mother’ seems not to agree very well with an active role of women in the world of organized crime.
However, since Landesco’s 1936 article about ‘The woman and the underworld’  several examples have been documented of women who play a rather active role in the world of organized crime.​[23]​ Block, for instance, studied organized crime at the turn of the century and concluded that women were in control of brothels, saloons, and illegal enterprises.​[24]​ More recently Bovenkerk gave a detailed description of the life of the Dutch girl Bettien Martens, who played a central role as a ‘go between’ for Colombian drugs trafficking organizations.​[25]​ Furthermore, Potter and Gaines concluded with regard to 28 criminal enterprises in a rural area: “Despite the fact that only 19 % of the participants were female (see table 2), this seems a high proportion in view to the fact that it counts only those individuals in a management or coordination role in the enterprise.”​[26]​ Calder screened all known commercially published autobiographies, biographies and case studies of persons associated with Italian-American organized crime and read this material for its content concerning Mafia women. One of his interesting conclusions is that “ … ample evidence suggests that Mafia women do not lead lives of blissful ignorance of the criminal circumstances of their men. They have significant insight into and awareness of criminal affiliations, and they have information about criminal conspiracies and rationalizations for criminal actions. Knowledge ranges from mere indicators of suspicious circumstances to participation in conspiracies” ​[27]​
	What do our case studies tell us about the role of women in organized crime? First of all, one cannot deny that men play the chief role in the world of organized crime. Of all the 703 suspects in our case studies 89 % was male and 11 % was female. In ten cases none of the suspects was female (case 12, 14, 15, 16, 21, 24, 27, 32, 36 and 40), although in some of these cases women, who formally were not suspects, played an active role (for instance: case 12, 15 and 27).
The female suspects are generally the partners of male suspects (57 %) or they are related by family ties, bonds of friendship or business relations. In the latter case women own companies (case 22, 26 and 37) or work with companies that facilitate the criminal association (case 18 and 39). There are also women who get involved in illegal activities as a client of a smuggler of illegal immigrants, as a victim of trafficking in women or by their work as prostitutes (case 4, 6, 9, 10a, 10b, 13 and 18).
Although most of the female suspects are the partners of male suspects, this does not mean that they purely play a passive role: ‘looking the other way’ and profiting from the proceeds of crime. Women really play an active role, which is not solely restricted to the simple jobs. It is true that they sometimes work as a drugs or money courier, a cleaner, a secretary or a clerk. More often, however, they carry out more important activities in the context of ‘shielding illegal activities’ against the authorities and in the context of ‘contacts and communication’.
In the context of ‘shielding illegal activities’ women provide safe storage of money or illegal goods or they provide safe places for shelter and for the production of drugs. They put their names and legal statuses at someone’s disposal for renting or buying companies, means of communication or means of transportation; or for sending parcel-post packages containing  drugs to their postal addresses (case 8). They also venture into fake marriages in order to obtain a legal status for male suspects (for instance: case 2). Furthermore, women (partially) own companies which facilitate illegal activities and may be used as a cover-up: a company which rents houses (case 22), a wholesale company (case 33), a clothing firm (case 26 and 37), an immigration office (case 9), a debt-collecting agency (case 30), a cosmetics company (case 20) or a second-hand shop (case 22).
Next to shielding illegal activities against the authorities, women play an important role in establishing and maintaining contacts. On the one hand they function as a messenger, a translator or a mediator. On the other hand they are also more than incidentally responsible for contacts with facilitators such as money-changers, couriers, travelling companions (smuggling of illegal immigrants) and banking agencies (case 2, 11, 18, 22 and 37). Next to that, women are responsible for establishing and maintaining contacts with suppliers and buyers of illegal goods and services (case 8, 9, 10b, 13, 19, 22, 28, 34 and 35).
Certainly in the latter case, women play a rather active role: they function as a ‘go between’ or they are in charge of import and distribution lines. In the analyzed cases we even find some examples of female suspects who are not only in charge of certain illegal activities, but who are also in charge of  a whole criminal association (case 4, 8, 13, 18 and 33). Four of these cases involve trafficking in women and sexual exploitation (case 4, 13, 18 and 33).
Summing up, women do indeed play an active role in the world of organized crime. They do not only have knowledge about illegal activities, but they also have crucial functions in the context of shielding illegal activities against the authorities and in the context of contacts and communication. Sometimes they are in charge of import and distributions lines and sometimes they are even in charge of a whole criminal association. The role of women in organized crime, however, is still a ‘blind spot’ in criminological research. Or, as Albanese has suggested: “whether the emergence of women as independent players in organized crime becomes more common … will depend to some extent on our willingness to examine their lives more closely, and as something more than mistresses to the mob”.​[28]​

6. The dynamics of criminal associations

The criminal associations, which we have analyzed, turn out to be less hierarchical, less stable, and far more ‘fluid’ than Cressey’s well-known bureaucratic model suggests.​[29]​ Dynamics is the most distinctive characteristic of these associations.​[30]​ Nobody is really irreplaceable; even important persons such as investors, organizers or facilitators can be substituted by others. It is true that other members of the criminal associations are dependent on their specific resources, such as money, knowledge and liaisons, but it would be a gross exaggeration to claim that these people are irreplaceable. Perhaps this is the main reason why criminal associations often seem to suffer little damage from arrests or seizures: links may be lost, but the chain is easily repaired.​[31]​ On the other hand, this fact also offers a plausible explanation for the emergence and the dynamics of criminal associations and criminal networks, as will be elucidated below.
	Although it is difficult to deduce from the analyzed cases the critical factors that have reinforced the criminal associations in question, several cases indicate the crucial role of the generation and availability of sufficient financial means and of the mutual transfer of knowledge and liaisons.
Money seems to be the chief underlying motive for the actions of offenders. Yet at the same time it also constitutes the main obstacle for cooperation. Easy money is often also spent very easily. Hence, collecting sufficient financial means for a criminal project is an ever- recurring problem, as is the distribution of profits and losses. Selfishness and short-sightedness often reign supreme placing considerable strain and pressure on the durability of criminal associations. Setbacks, therefore, easily put an end to criminal cooperation. However, partners in crime do not only terminate their cooperation because of disagreement on the distribution of losses; sometimes they also part, since they are dissatisfied with their share of profits or because they believe there are more attractive opportunities to be found elsewhere. Generally it is quite easy to find new partners in crime.
Hence, the main characteristics of durable criminal associations are infrequent setbacks and well-managed finances. The most obvious examples of such associations concern some major native Dutch drug traffickers. Thanks to the tolerant Dutch policy towards soft drugs and the low priority of prosecuting wholesale hashish dealers in the seventies and eighties, they did not only have easy access to the Dutch market, but they could also develop into rather important players in the international drugs trade.​[32]​ A huge financial buffer makes offenders less dependent on others, less vulnerable to setbacks, and more reliable as business partners. Furthermore, a certain financial buffer can also reduce the pressure on criminal cooperation, as is clearly illustrated by a criminal association which owned a vast ‘collective fund’, covering all the costs of common projects as well as receiving all the profits. Such a well-managed criminal cooperation, however, seems to be the exception rather than the rule. In far more cases, we see that offenders have ‘to start from the beginning’ every time by scraping together sufficient financial means for their criminal projects. This is especially the case, if they engage in huge and risky criminal projects such as shipping vast amounts of drugs from one country to another.
	The importance of well-managed finances does not only apply to risky criminal projects involving large amounts of money. It also applies to smaller sums of money being paid by large numbers of clients. This is, for instance, the case in the context of smuggling illegal immigrants, as is illustrated by case 9. We will elaborate upon this case a bit further, since it also illuminates some other factors that foster criminal associations.

Illegal immigrants from Iran were smuggled by airplane via Europe to Canada. The suspects involved were A and B, who lived in the Netherlands, as well as several compatriots in Iran and Canada (among others ex-clients and family members). They probably smuggled on average 240 to 300 persons per year.
A had already been involved in forging documents and smuggling illegal immigrants from the Netherlands to Canada since 1987. Although he was arrested for forgery and receiving in 1989, he only got a conditional sentence. Hence, he continued his activities. His good reputation as a counterfeiter of passports stimulated his supply of clients as well as his supply of passports. Such a lot of suppliers and buyers of passports frequented his premises, that a fellow smuggler of immigrants called his house literally ‘a passport market’. At a certain moment A had a stock of as many as 400 passports at his disposal, enabling him to find very easily a ‘plausible’ passport for any client, travel route and destination, which was subsequently adapted by a relatively simple ‘photo change’. The payments caused no problems, since A had family members in Iran and planned to emigrate to Canada. Consequently, clients or their family members were also allowed to meet their liabilities in Iran or Canada. Furthermore, A earned money in the Netherlands by producing forgeries for other smugglers and – if necessary – he called on money transfers from Canada.
In the summer of 1994 B, an asylum seeker who had been refused admittance to Germany, established contact with A in order to travel to Canada. As the attempted exit failed, B returned to A’s premises and became acquainted with the daily practice of smuggling illegal immigrants. After B had taken the initiative to support A more and more, he presently got a salary for his activities. After some time B’s family ties resulted in contacts with D and E in Iran, increasing B’s role in establishing contacts with potential clients, maintaining his liaisons with Iran, and managing the financial aspects of the smuggling activities. A devoted almost all his time to his ‘specialization’ (the forgery of documents), to buying tickets and passports, and to accompanying his clients to various airports. The illegal activities increased so much that they called on C, a client who had a good command of the English language. Furthermore, they were supported by A and B’s girl friends and by clients waiting to get out of the country.
Since A had already planned to leave for Canada a long time ago, he wanted B to take over his activities. Hence, A granted B a loan, gave him his mobile phone (with a number well-known to clients as well as fellow smugglers), and he tried to teach B how to forge documents. B, however, mainly led by pursuit of profit, was more interested in an exuberant lifestyle than in learning A’s tips and tricks. Hence, they clashed: A took back his mobile phone and cut off the worldwide-known number. Yet he tried to teach his trade to three new companions of B.
Subsequently, A and B went on separately, each with his own associates. The defects in B’s forgeries and travel routes, however, resulted in a lot a clients being caught at airports (this was also an effect of the police investigations). B’s stock of waiting clients increased, also because he used a lot of his clients’ money for his own purposes. B’s clients became dissatisfied and sometimes turned to A. B’s pinching situation eventually made him leave the stage without any trace, taking with him a large amount of his customers’ money. As many as thirty duped customers were left behind. A subsequently helped them to leave the country and, just before he was to leave for Canada, he was arrested (case 9).

This case not only illustrates the benefits of well-managed finances, but it also illuminates some other factors that foster continuing criminal associations.
First of all, the criminal activities grow because there are few setbacks. The quality of the forgeries is good and the risk of detection is low. As the logistical ‘bottlenecks’ such as finances and passports become less pressing, the amount of smuggled immigrants increases steadily.
Second, we see that people in the direct social environment are drawn more and more into the illegal activities. Sometimes they merely facilitate the smuggling activities, but sometimes they also play a very central role such as B and C. This process is generally referred to as ‘recruitment’. Such a term, however, suggests a far more passive role of the recruited persons than we come across in our case studies. In several analyzed cases people gradually but knowingly become involved in illegal activities. In some cases it is rather the ‘recruited’ person who takes the initiative than the criminal association.
Third, the supply of customers grows via social relations: satisfied customers or their family members introduce new customers, and fellow smugglers who buy forged passports from A, sometimes ask him to take care of the journey from Europe to Canada. The introduction of acquaintances by acquaintances also fosters A’s supply of passports and other identity documents which are to be forged. It should be noted that the communication about these illegal activities seems to be relatively ‘open’, a pattern which is also demonstrated by other cases.​[33]​ 
Fourth, we see that successful criminal associations may foster surrounding criminal associations. The skillful forgeries of A benefit both his own smuggling activities and the activities of fellow smugglers: M, for instance, started with smuggling family members and friends, but because of the availability of good forgeries his smuggling activities expand more and more. A also produces ‘starters’: L, an ex-client of A, starts to smuggle illegal immigrants from Iran to Japan, and he often asks A to care for the journey from Europe to Japan. There is also cooperation between A and fellow smugglers: they exchange or trade passports which they cannot use themselves, and they ‘put out’ parts of journeys to one another.
Finally, the transfer of knowledge and contacts creates a kind of ‘snowball effect’: people get in touch with criminal associations through their social relations, and - as they go along - their dependency on the resources of other people (such as money, knowledge and contacts) gradually declines; subsequently they choose their own ways: they generate new criminal associations attracting people from their own social environment, and the story begins all over again. Clear examples of this ‘snowball effect’ can also be discerned in cases concerning fraud (for instance: case 29), trafficking in women and sexual exploitation (for instance: case 10b), and the production of synthetic drugs (for instance: case 3).
	Perhaps this ‘snowball effect’ is the most important principle of the development of criminal associations: people get in touch with criminal associations through their social relations; as they go along their dependency on the resources of other people (such as money, knowledge and contacts) gradually declines; and finally they generate new criminal associations, which subsequently attract people from their social environment again. In our view this ‘snowball effect’ is more characteristic for the development of the analyzed criminal associations than the traditional view on ‘recruitment’: criminal associations recruiting ‘outsiders’, who start with doing the ‘dirty jobs’ and who are able to climb the hierarchic ladder by proving their capability.​[34]​ This traditional view, however, grossly underestimates the dynamics we have discerned in the analyzed cases. It might give a good description of the ‘recruitment process’ in some cases concerning international drugs trafficking; yet in the other cases the ‘snowball effect’ paints a better picture of the development of criminal associations.

7. Conclusion     

Social relations are crucial for understanding the phenomenon of organized crime. This claim has been substantiated in this article by elaborating upon four different subjects.
The first subject was the role of social relations in international criminal associations. We concluded that in many analyzed cases family ties as well as bonds of friendship turned out to be the foundation for international criminal associations.
The second subject was the assumed ethnic homogeneity and ‘ethnic intimacy’ of criminal groups. We argued that the connection between ethnicity and organized crime is in fact a spurious one and that the ethnic heterogeneity and ‘openness’ of organized crime groups is far more notable than is generally assumed.
The third subject was the underexposed role of women in organized crime. It was concluded that women play a far more important role in the analyzed cases than is generally assumed. Women do not only have knowledge about illegal activities but they also have crucial functions in the context of shielding illegal activities against the authorities and in the context of contacts and communication. Sometimes they are in charge of import and distributions lines and sometimes they are even in charge of the whole criminal association.
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